Socialism is dead, long live socialism! by Popov, Vladimir
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Socialism is dead, long live socialism!
Vladimir Popov
New Economic School
9. March 2014
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/54294/
MPRA Paper No. 54294, posted 10. March 2014 02:48 UTC
 1 
SOCIALIM IS DEAD, LONG LIVE SOCIALISM! 
 
 
Vladimir Popov1 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Utopian socialists believed that socialism is inevitable because it is a more rational system to 
organize production and life, a system more in line with the “good” nature of human beings. 
Marxism rejected this reasoning replacing it with what is known as historical materialism: social 
systems, it argued, emerge, develop and die not because they correspond more or less to the 
“natural” aspirations of the people, but because they become more or less competitive in the 
process of historical evolution – a version of social Darwinism applied not to individuals, but to 
communities and countries. In particular, Marxism stated that capitalism develops productive 
forces up to the point when they can no longer be managed efficiently in societies with markets 
and private property; at this point social property of the means of production and centrally 
planned economy (CPE) become a more efficient way of managing productive forces, whose 
social nature has outgrown the narrow capitalist limits. This prediction did not come true – in the 
XX century socialism came to being not in most advanced capitalist countries, but in the 
periphery and semi-periphery (USSR, Eastern Europe, China, North Korea, Cuba), and only in 
North Korea and Cuba it survived into the XXI century.  
 
This paper explains why capitalism was competitive in recent 500 years, and why an attempt in 
the XX century to replace it by socialist CPEs did not succeed. But it argues that there are other 
reasons, not associated with “social nature of productive forces”, which are finally going to make 
socialism competitive: the costs of numerous negative consequences of high income inequalities, 
like greater social tensions, high crime and poor institutional capacity of the state, become larger 
than the benefits of high savings and investment rate that were making capitalism competitive for 
500 years. This “new socialism” will not be necessarily mean a total elimination of markets and 
private property, but is likely to limit both substantially for the sake of achieving lower income 
inequality. 
 
                                               
1
 The opinions expressed herein are strictly personal and do not necessarily reflect the position of organizations 
with which the author is associated. 
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SOCIALIM IS DEAD, LONG LIVE SOCIALISM! 
 
 Vladimir Popov 
 
Robert Heilbroner, the author of the “Worldly Philosophers”, the most famous economic history 
book ever, wrote that political economy tradition is different from economics that emerged later. 
Classical economists were interested in the dynamics of the capitalist system, trying to explain 
how capitalism emerges, develops, reaches maturity, and dies, whereas economics is 
preoccupied with equilibrium and optimum in the basically static and allegedly eternal market 
system (Heilbroner, 1999). This paper follows the political economy tradition and asks a 
question why in future capitalism will die and will be replaced by a more advanced form of 
social organization.  
 
The logic of the argument in a nutshell is presented in the scheme below. Capitalism emerged in 
the 16th century after traditional societies started to dismantle community institutions (in Britain 
– enclosure policy). This led to the increase in income inequality, which pushed up savings rate, 
investment and productivity growth, but at a price of impoverishment of the masses and growing 
social tensions. Until XX century though, capitalism was competitive because gains from 
productivity growth outweighed losses from rising inequalities and social polarisation. But 
growing social tensions finally resulted in the Russian 1917 revolution that gave birth to socialist 
society that proved to be able to lower inequalities and mobilize domestic savings for the catch 
up development. The existence of the USSR had a moderating effect on the world capitalism – it 
started to acquire a human face by expanding social programs and lowering inequalities, 
especially after the Second World War and the emergence of the world socialist system. 
Centrally planned economy, however, had inherent deficiencies in allocating resources and 
replacing aging fixed capital stock, so the Soviet economy started to slow down in the 1960s, 30 
years after the ‘big push”. It finally led to the loss of economic and social dynamism, to the 
collapse of socialism in USSR and Eastern Europe, and to gradual transformation of socialism 
into capitalism in China and Vietnam.  Left to themselves, without government regulations and 
checks and balances, competitive markets tend to increase inequality endlessly and this is exactly 
what is happening after 1980 in most capitalist countries. Chances are that this growing 
polarisation will result in the democratic transition to the new social organization that would be 
more competitive than capitalism due to its ability to maintain high savings and investment 
without high inequalities.  
 3 
Scheme. Transitions to and from capitalism  
                                                                                                   Period 
Before 1500 
 
1500-1917 1917-1940s 1950s-1960s 1970s-1990s 1990s-onwards Future 
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=Socialism no longer looks 
like a viable alternative 
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the 1980s in the West 
(Thatcher, Reagan) 
 
=Dismantling of social 
programs 
 
=Inequalities start to rise 
again 
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push” Soviet economy 
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the inherent deficiencies of 
CPE in allocating resources 
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of fixed capital 
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USSR 
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=Low 
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=Low 
savings rate 
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of collectivist 
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rate of 
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Socialist 
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Russia 
(1917), 
emergence of 
CPE 
 
=Low 
inequalities 
 
=Mobilisati-
on of savings 
without 
increase in 
inequalities 
 
 
“Golden 
age” of 
capitalism  
 
=Under the 
influence of 
the socialist 
“alter ego” 
post-war 
capitalism 
grows 
relatively 
fast with low 
inequalities 
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social 
programs 
Only Cuba 
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socialist, 
socialism 
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welfare 
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Deprived of 
checks and 
balances 
(world 
socialism, 
strong 
workers 
movement), 
most 
capitalist 
countries 
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the rise in 
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inequalities and 
social tensions in 
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=Some countries 
become socialist as 
a result of 
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transition of 
power to leftist 
parties 
 
=Political 
spectrum in 
capitalist 
countries moves 
to the left 
 
=More state 
enterprises, non-
profit 
institutions, 
coops and LME 
 
=More social 
programs  
 
=More 
progressive 
taxation 
 
=Lower income 
inequalities 
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Why capitalism was competitive? 
To start from the very beginning, one has to answer a question why capitalism became more 
competitive than other social systems.  The hard fact is that before 1500, countries that are now 
called “the West” were no more developed than the rest. All countries had roughly the same 
GDP per capita (about $500 in 1990 prices), similar life expectancy, consumption and education 
(literacy) levels (Mel’yantsev, 2006; Maddison, 2008).   
 
Since the 16th century the West started to grow faster than “the rest” by one or even two orders of 
magnitude, so that by 1900 the gap between the groups of countries that are now called 
developed and developing increased to 6:1. In 2000, it was roughly at the same level although in 
the second half of the twentieth century, several developing countries/territories (Japan, South 
Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and Hong Kong) managed to join the “rich club,” while others 
(Southeast Asia, China and more recently – India) succeeded in considerably bridging the gap 
with rich countries; other regions (Sub-Saharan Africa, Eastern Europe, and FSU) fell behind or 
failed to reduce the gap with the West (fig. 1.1).   
 
 
Fig. 1. PPP GDP per capita in major countries and regions since 1500, international Geary-
Khamis dollars of 1990 
 
 
\ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PPP GDP per capita in major countries and regions since 1500, 1990 
international Geary-Khamis dollars; source: A. Maddison; log scale)
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Productivity growth in Western Europe in the first millennium was not only absent, but in fact 
was negative. In most countries, according to Maddison (2008), there was no increase in per 
capita GDP, whereas in Italy it actually fell by about 50% - from $809 in the 1 AD to 450 in 
1000 AD. The next 500 years saw a slow recovery to the income levels achieved in the Roman 
Empire – per capita GDP grew by 0.13 % a year and nearly doubled. Since 1500, however, in the 
Netherlands and then in Britain growth of per capita income accelerated to 0.25-0.6% a year and 
in the 19-20th century growth in Western Europe and the US increased to 1-2% a year (table 1).   
 
Table 1.  Per capita GDP growth rates, % 
Countries/periods 1-1000 1000-
1500 
1500-
1600 
1600-
1700 
1700-
1820 
1820-
1900 
1900-
2000 
The  Netherlands 0 0.12 0.60 0.43 -0.12 0.78 1.89 
United Kingdom 0 0.12 0.31 0.25 0.26 1.22 1.52 
Italy -0.06 0.18 0 0 0.01 0.59 2.38 
Total 12 Western Europe -0.03 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.16 1.14 1.89 
US 0 0 0 0.28 0.73 1.49 1.96 
Source: Maddison, 2010.  
 
This transition to modern economic growth after millenniums of stagnation and centuries of 
slowly creeping forward productivity was a truly groundbreaking event in human history. To  
understand the magnitude of change: with 0.1% annual growth it takes nearly 700 years to 
double the initial level, with 0.5% annual growth it takes nearly 140 years, with 1% annual 
growth – 70 years, with 2% –   35 years.  
 
The usual explanation of how the West got rich ahead of others is that countries that we now call 
developed, or the West, acquired in the 16th century and afterwards some features that were 
absent in more traditional societies. The list of these features is mostly associated with capitalism 
and democracy and ranges from abolition of serfdom and protestant ethics to protection of 
property rights and free universities. The problem with this reasoning is that it is assumed that 
these features emerged initially only in North-Western Europe and only in the 16th -18th century. 
However, in fact, there were many countries before the 16th century (ancient Greece is just one 
example) with social structures that possessed or were conducive to many of these same features, 
but they never experienced productivity growth comparable to the one that started in Britain and 
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the Netherlands in the 16th century and later – in the rest of Europe (0.2-0.3% a year in 1500-
1800 and 1% and more a year afterwards).  
 
A different interpretation (Popov, 2009; 2014) accepted in this paper is that Western countries 
exited the Malthusian trap by dismantling traditional collectivist institutions, which led to 
increased income inequality and allowed the redistribution of income in favour of savings and 
investment at the expense of consumption. At a low level of income allowing inequalities to 
rise was the only way to increase voluntary savings rate. But there was also a downside of 
growing inequalities – a decline in life expectancy and an increase in social tensions that 
undermined the institutional capacity of the state. The elimination of collectivist (community) 
institutions was thus a risky experiment that speeded up growth at a price of putting the masses 
of population below the subsistence minimum and causing a reduction or slow down of growth 
of the population – the foundation of the military might (number of people – number of 
soldiers) in the Malthusian growth regime.  
 
Early attempts to ensure the priority of the rights of individual over the rights of the 
community at the expense of collective interests and low inequality (Greece, Rome, Byzantine) 
led to the impoverishment of the masses, higher mortality and foreign conquest. Only in 
Northwest Europe in the 16-18th centuries this policy somehow succeeded for the first time in 
history.  
 
It is not the abundance of competition or entrepreneurship or ideas for technological 
innovations that allowed the West to accelerate the growth rates of productivity by the order of 
magnitude, it is first and foremost the abundance of savings and investment that resulted from 
growing income inequalities and allowed to increase the capital/labor ratio and to cast in metal 
the ideas for new products and technologies. To put it differently, the West became rich not 
due to its inventiveness and entrepreneurial spirit, but due to cruel and merciless dismantling of 
community that previously provided social guarantees to the poorest.  
 
Savings rate is determined by many factors (Norman, Schmidt-Hebbel & Luis Servén 2000), 
but at a low level of income the crucial factor is income inequality. At the very low level of 
income (subsistence minimum) people are not making any savings, all income is used for 
consumption. Increase in inequality resulting from redistribution of income will lead to the 
reduction of consumption by the poor (they will not make any savings, and possibly would 
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even die out), but the rich will make more savings not being able to consume all increased 
income.  
 
Micro studies consistently show that the rich households and individuals save more than the 
poor, but the national savings rate is not necessarily higher in countries with high inequalities. 
Redistribution and increase in inequalities will lead to higher savings of those who get rich, but 
to lower savings of those that are getting poorer. These two effects could cancel one another. 
That is why current research does not show any link between inequalities and savings rate 
neither for developed, nor for developing countries (Schmidt-Hebbel, & Serven, 2000). But at 
low levels of income the increase in national savings, provided that the productivity is 
constant, is possible only through redistribution from rich to poor because at low levels of 
income elasticity of savings on income is very low: reduction of income of the poor does not 
lead to decline in savings (which are extremely low to begin with), whereas increase in income 
of the rich leads to an increase in savings.  
 
 
The hard fact is that savings and investment rates before 500 years ago were very low, less 
than 5% of GDP only, so that investment was barely enough to replace the retiring elements of 
fixed capital stock and to create jobs for the new entrants into the labor  force. There wasn’t 
much left to increase capital/labor ratio – the key determinant of the productivity, so per capita 
GDP virtually did not grow over time.  
 
Enclosure policy and the Industrial Revolution resulted in a dramatic increase in income 
inequality, which led to the increase in the national savings rate. Despite the acceleration of 
productivity growth in 1500-1800 in the UK (to about 0.2 percent a year, so that GDP per 
capita in the UK more than doubled over three centuries2), the living standards of workers did 
not improve. “The single most important fact is that there is no evidence of any significant rise 
in material living standards for average workers in any societies before 1830” (Goldstone, 
2007). Real wages actually fell between 1500 and 1800 (Saito, 2009). This is consistent with 
the story of rising income inequality, accumulation of wealth in the hands of a few, and 
                                               
2
 GDP per capita in the UK increased in constant 1990 international Geary-Khamis dollars from $714 in 1500 
to $974 in 1600, to $1250 in 1700, and to $1706 in 1820 (Maddison, 2010).  
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increasing savings and investment rates (the latter increased during the Industrial Revolution 
from a mere 6 percent in 1760 to 12 percent in 1831—Galor, 1998)3. 
 
Even in the second half of the 19th century national savings amounted only to 10-15% of 
GDP in major European countries and in Japan; only in the United States savings and 
investment rates steadily exceeded 20% in 1874-1899 (Taylor, 1996). In 1890-1913 gross 
savings rates in Australia, Canada, France, Japan, and UK were estimated in the range of 9 
to 15% only (table 2). 
 
Table 2. Total gross savings as a ratio of GDP at current market prices, % 
Period/ 
Countries 
 
1870-89  1890- 19l3 19l4- 38  1939- 49 1950- 73 1974- 88 
Australia  11.2a  12.5a 12.2 24.3 22.0 l3.8 
Canada  9.lb l2.2b l4.4b 22.5  21.4  l9.3 
France  l2.8 l4.7 n.a. n.a. 23.4 22.l  
Germany  n.a.  n.a.  l2.8c n.a.  26.7 22.4  
India  n.a.  5.8d  7.4  6.7 l2.8  20.3 
Japan  l2.4e  l2.4e  l6.7e 24.8e  32.8  32.8  
Korea  n.a.  n.a  4.3f  n.a.  8.lg  27.9  
Netherlands  n.a.  n.a. l5.2i  n.a 26.6  22.l  
Taiwan  n.a.  9.6j  25.5k  n.a. l9.9  33.2 
UK  l3.9 l3.6  8.8  2.5  l8.4 l8.5  
USA  n.a.  l8.0 l7.0 l5.2 l9.6  l7.9 
a) excludes inventories; b) l870-l926 excludes inventories; c) l925-38; d) l900-l3; e) l885-l940  
excludes inventories and first entry is for l885-9; f) excludes part of inventories; g) l953-73; h) 
l953-9; i) l92l-38; j) l903-l3 and excludes part of inventories; k) excludes part of inventories. 
 
Source: Maddison, 1992.  
 
 
Today many developing countries, especially least developed ones, have very low domestic 
savings and investment rates (fig. 2, 3). Normally growth rates of such countries are low or 
even negative – the relationship between savings rate, investment rate and growth rates of GDP 
is one of the most robust in empirical research of economic growth (fig. 4). For such countries 
                                               
3
 According to C. Feinstein, the saving rate as a percent of GDP was below 8% in the first half of the 18th century. 
It started to rise in the 1740 or 1750s and reached 13-14% in the 1810-60 (Feinstein, 1978).  
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mobilisation of domestic savings or savings from abroad is pre-condition for successful 
development and catch up with rich countries.  
 
 
Fig. 2. Total savings in Argentina, % of GDP 
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Source: Taylor (1996). 
 
Fig. 3. Gross domestic savings as a % of GDP in 1970-2011 and PPP GDP per capita as a % of the 
US level in 1990 
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Source: World Development Indicators database.  
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Fig. 4. The ratio of gross domestic savings to GDP and average annual growth rates of GDP per 
capita in 1970-2011, %, 
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Source: World Development Indicators database.   
 
 
Developing countries entered the period of modern economic growth (Kuznets, 1966) with 
high savings and investment rates only one or two hundred years after developed countries or 
even later. Even Argentina, that was considered to belong to a rich country club in between two 
world wars, never had a 10 year average savings rate of over 10%  before the 1930s (fig. 2) In 
India before independence (1900-49) savings rate stayed at a level of 6-7% only; in Korea in 
1914-38 – 4% of GDP (table 2).  
 
It is the Lewis model of economic growth that assumes the unlimited supplies of labour in 
agriculture that keeps wages low despite rapid accumulation of capital in industry. In the words 
of Arthur Lewis, “the central problem in the theory of economic development is to understand 
the process by which a community which was previously saving and investing 4 or 5 per cent 
of its national income or less, converts itself into the economy where voluntary saving is 
running at about 12 to 15 percent of national income or more. This is the central problem 
because the central fact of economic development is capital accumulation” (Lewis, 1954).   
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 Thanks to higher savings rate and higher investment, by 1800 productivity in the West was 
already 2 to 3 times higher than in the rest of the world, the Western military might was 
predominant and the possibility of defeat in a direct military conflict with non-Western 
societies was negligible. But the social costs were mounting ― inequalities grew, masses of 
population were impoverished, contributing to social tensions and weakening of institutional 
capacity of the state.  
 
There is a view that competitive capitalism, left to itself, without any government regulation, 
can ensure a fair and stable distribution of income and an “optimal” degree of inequality – all 
agents, the owners of labour, capital, land, intellectual property, etc., are getting remuneration 
equal to their marginal productivity, which brings social harmony. Only market imperfections, 
such as credit constraints and lack of access to education, can result in “unreasonable 
inequalities”. This view, however, is not shared by all economists. “Markets, by themselves, 
even when they are stable, often lead to high levels of inequality, outcomes that are widely 
viewed as unfair’, writes Joseph Stiglitz (2014, p. 9). Piketty (2014) believes that rising 
inequality is a long term trend caused by the increase in wealth (capital) to output ratio, K/Y, 
that leads to the rise of the share of capital in national income (“patrimonial capitalism”) and 
that this trend will continue into the future. True, is not clear, if the increase in capital versus 
labour would not cause the decline in the rate of profit that will counterbalance the growth of 
capital (Milanovic, 2014).  But even with a stable K/Y ratio increase in inequality in perfectly 
competitive markets seems to be quite inevitable.  
 
For the sake of the argument, imagine a society of entrepreneurs that have exactly the same 
income and that are owners of capital and workers at the same time with no hired labour. It is 
quite obvious that in a period of time there would be polarization – some will do worse than 
the others and will have eventually to sell their businesses to the ones that are better off, will 
become proletariat and will compete for jobs at businesses of their more fortunate peers. This 
in fact is happening in rural countries – peasant differentiation leads to higher inequalities. 
 
To continue the example, there is a concentration of capital going on because large companies 
have the advantages of scale and scope and, ceteris paribus, are better suited to surpass 
competitors. The trend of the perfect market is to end up with one super-company controlling 
the whole world, and one individual controlling this company, but it does not happen due to 
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anti-trust legislation, progressive taxation, social programs, and other counterweighing 
policies.    
 
There are other factors, of course, that influence inequality trends. CEOs and top managers, as 
Piketty notes himself, are not rewarded according to their marginal productivity, but rather by 
collusion between them and the owners. The markets are far from being perfect and 
monopolies, or at least oligopolies, in the market are the rule rather than the exception. The 
Kuznets (1955) hypothesis is that there is an inverted U-shape relationship between economic 
growth and inequality – it increases at the industrialization stage, when the urban-rural income 
gap rises, and declines later with the rise of the welfare state. But current empirical research 
does not find much support for the existence of Kuznets curve. The long term dynamics of 
inequalities seem to be such that they increased in 1500-1900 probably reaching an all time 
peak in the early 20th century (see charts in the last section) and only after the First World War 
and Russian 1917 revolution started to decline. .  
 
The social costs of growing inequalities were numerous. At the initial stage (enclosure policy) 
masses of the population were driven below the poverty line and literally died out. Life 
expectancy declined from about 35 to 40 years to about 30 to 35 years in 1560-1730 (fig. 5). 
Annual average population growth rates in Britain fell from 0.7 percent in 1000-1500 to 0.4 
percent in the sixteenth century and to 0.3 percent in the seventeenth before increasing to 0.9 
percent and 0.8 percent in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The respective figures for 
twenty-nine West European countries were: 0.8 percent, 0.3 percent, 0.1 percent, 0.5 percent, 
and 0.7 percent (Maddison, 2008).  
 
To add insult to injury, increase in inequalities and social polarisation weakened state 
institutions. Institutional capacity of the state, according to a narrow definition, is the ability of 
the government to enforce laws and regulations. While there are a lot of subjective indices 
(corruption, rule of law, government effectiveness, etc.) that are supposed to measure the state 
institutional capacity, many researchers do not think they help to explain economic 
performance and consider them biased (Khan, 2007). The natural objective measures of the 
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state institutional capacity are the murder rate – non-compliance with the state’s monopoly on 
violence4, and the shadow economy – non compliance with the economic regulations.  
 
 
Fig. 5.  Mortality Rates and Life Expectancy (at birth) in the Course of Early 
Urbanization: England 1540-1870  
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Source: Wrigley and Schofield, 1981, p. 231. 
 
 
Western Europe had a murder rate of over 40 per 100, 000 inhabitants in the 16th century; it 
took 300 years to move to current levels of 1-2 murders per 100,000 inhabitants in the 19th 
century and beyond (fig. 6). Even in the seventeenth century, the murder rates in Western 
Europe generally exceeded 10 per 100,000 inhabitants — more than in many developing 
countries with a similar level of GDP per capita today. The US murder rate in the 19th century 
stayed at a level of 10-20 per 100,000, and in the 20th century – about 5 to 10 (Fisher, 2011).  
 
                                               
4
 Crimes are registered differently in different countries—higher crime rates in developed countries seem to be the 
result of better registration of crimes. But grave crimes, like murders, appear to be registered quite accurately even 
in developing countries, so international comparison of murder rates is well warranted. See Popov , 2011. 
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By the beginning of the 19th century European murder rates fell to the current level of 1-2 per 
100,000 inhabitants, but the social development until the beginning of the XX century could 
hardly be characterized as peaceful – revolutions happened one after another (Europe – 1830 
and 1848, France – 1871, Russia – 1905 and 1917, Hungary and Germany – 1918).  
 
Fig. 6. Long term homicide rates in Europe per 100,000 inhabitants   
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In developing countries that followed the Westernization path (Latin America, Sub-Sahara 
Africa, Russia), either as part of colonial empires or more or less voluntarily, there was an 
unprecedented increase in income inequalities, crime and social tensions.  
 
In Russia the Emancipation Act of 1861 led to the dramatic rise in income and wealth 
inequalities and speeded up the differentiation of peasantry. As table 3 shows, the share of 
“middle class” peasants remained stable at a 50% level in 1600-1860, but fell to 23% by the 
end of the 1800s at the expense of the increase in the share of wealthy peasants on the one side, 
and poor peasants on the other. As a result, the number of peasant disturbances increased from 
                                               
5
 All 398 local estimates from the History of Homicide Database; national series for Sweden, England and Wales, 
Switzerland, and Italy. 
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10-30 a year in the early 1800 to 300 before the Emancipation Act of 1861 to 3000 during the 
first Russian revolution of 1905-07 (fig. 7), whereas the crime rate increased more than 
threefold in 1850-1910 – from 500 to over 1500 per 100,000 inhabitants (fig. 8).  
 
Table 3. Increase in inequalities in Russia in 1600-1900. Social structure of Russian 
peasantry, % of total 
Years
 
Wealthy 
 
Middle 
 
Poor 
 
1600-
1750 
 
15 
 
53 
 
32 
 
1751-
1800 
 
10 
 
48 
 
42 
 
1801-
1860 
 
16 
 
56   
 
30 
 
1896-
1900 
 
18 
 23 
 
59 
 
Source: Turchin and Nefedov (2009, p. 277). 
 
Fig. 7. The number of peasant disturbances per year in 1800-1920 
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Source: Dubrovsky (1956), Litvak. (1967), Zayonchkovsky, P. (1963) cited in Turchin 
and Nefedov (2009: 286). 
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Fig. 8. Number of total crimes per 100,000 inhabitants in Russia in 1800-1920  
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Source: Mironov  (2000) cited in Turchin and Nefedov, p. 285. 
 
 
In short, by the early XX century capitalism could have been quite successful economically, 
but a total failure from a social point of view – two Russian 1917 revolutions were a proof of 
the capitalist suicidal tendencies in the absence of proper checks and balances. After 1917 and 
especially after the Second World War and the creation of the world socialist system, 
capitalism had to adjust to look competitive – social expenditure in the West increased greatly, 
welfare programs mushroomed and income inequalities decreased significantly – up until the 
early 1980s (the data are in the third section of the paper).  
 
 
         The rise and fall of Soviet socialism 
The 1917 revolutions were the natural reaction to the misfortunate post 1861 reform 
developments. The great socialist experiment in Russia (1917-91) – the courageous attempt to 
restore social justice and institutional capacity of the state – resulted in the decrease in wealth 
and income inequalities, mortality, crime rate and shadow economy. The belief also was that 
socialist centrally planned economy (CPE) would achieve higher productivity than capitalism 
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and that remaining capitalist countries will eventually face the option of falling behind the 
Soviet Russia in per capita income or switching to socialism.   
 
Socialist thinkers – from Thomas Moore and Tommaso Campanella to Saint-Simon, Fourier 
and Owen to Marx, Engels and Lenin – were dreaming about more rational and just society not 
without a reason. The deficiencies of the capitalist market were obvious and numerous. 
Equilibrium in the market economy is achieved only through deviations from equilibrium. All 
kind of supply and demand shocks in different markets push the economy out of equilibrium. 
There is permanent unemployment and there are unloaded production capacities. There is a 
business cycle – periodically, once in 5 to 10 years, capitalist economy gets into a recession, 
i.e. experiences contraction of output that lasts 1 to 2 years. Markets fail in many instances – in 
providing public goods, in adequately regulating externalities, in selecting projects with long 
term time horizon (like fundamental research, development of new territories and/or 
industries).  
 
There is hardly any social justice – when prices fall due to overproduction, even most diligent 
and efficient producers cannot recover their costs, whereas when prices rise due to shocks (for 
instance, increase in demand for national flags after 9/11), producers get windfall profits. There 
are bubbles and huge volatility in stock and real estate prices, resource prices and exchange 
rates. “Irrational exuberance” – an expression used by Federal Reserve Chairman Alan 
Greenspan – is not an exaggeration or a temporary and limited in space phenomenon, it is 
rather an essential, permanent and pervasive characteristic of many markets, from stock market 
to commodities markets. It is impossible to explain rationally how prices of oil, for instance, go 
from $13 (1998) to over $100 (2008) in a matter of several years in the absence of major 
change in fundamentals. The human being, the crown of creation, whose mental abilities are 
second to none, is being reduced to being an instrument of the market forces; her destiny and 
wellbeing are determined by the merciless and often irrational mechanics of the markets that 
she neither understands, nor controls.  
 
As early theoreticians of socialism believed, a centrally planned economy organized rationally 
– the whole society working as one single plant – should be able to avoid these losses and thus 
to achieve higher efficiency.  “In the last analysis, – wrote Lenin in 1919, – productivity of 
labour is the most important, the principal thing for the victory of the new social system. 
Capitalism created a productivity of labour unknown under serfdom. Capitalism can be utterly 
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vanquished, and will be utterly vanquished, by the fact that socialism creates a new and much 
higher productivity of labour” (Lenin, 1919, p. 231). And initially it seemed like the prophecy 
was coming true – the USSR was doing better than any other developing country in terms of 
catching up with the West.  
 
Soviet catch-up development looked extremely impressive until the 1970s. In fact, from the 
1920s to 1960s, the USSR and Japan were the only two major developing countries that 
successfully, if only partially, bridged the gap with the West (fig. 1). Russia was permanently 
falling behind the West in the 16-19th century – neither reforms of Peter the Great in the early 
18th century, nor the elimination of serfdom in 1861 (Emancipation Act), nor Witte’s and 
Stolypin’s reforms in the early 20th century could have changed the trend. Only in the 1920s-
60s Russia (USSR), for the first time in its history, started to catch up with the West (fig. 9).  
 
 
 
Fig. 9. PPP GDP per capita in the USSR and Russia, % of Western European and US 
level 
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GDP  per capita in the USSR, % of  the Western European level 
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Source: Maddison, 2010.  
 
 
Despite popular beliefs that Soviet economic development was a failure, the USSR in 1928-70 
was the second fastest growing country in world after Japan (Allen, 2003, fig. 1.1, p.7). Many 
developing countries all over the world were trying to copy the Soviet model in the 1950s-60s, 
even though Soviet assistance at that time was minimal and in any case way below Western 
assistance. The Soviet model at a time was probably no less attractive for the developing world 
than the Chinese economic model today.  
 
 “Red Plenty”, a novel by Francis Spufford, nicely captures the atmosphere of that time – the 
belief that the gap between the USSR and the West is closing down and will disappear soon 
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because socialism is not only a more advanced social system, but also a more competitive 
economy. During the famous “kitchen debate” of 1959 Soviet leader Nikita Khruschev 
famously refused to admit that capitalism can have better innovations at least in some areas. 
Richard Nixon, the US vice president, opening an American exhibition  in Moscow, offered  a 
diplomatic formula – you are ahead in space, we are ahead in colored TV, let us compete for 
the benefit of consumers in both countries. Khruschev, as soon as Nixon’s words were 
translated to him, raised his hand up in objection: we surpassed you in rockets, we’ll surpass 
you in TV, he said (Khruschev and Nixon, 1959). Not only in the Soviet Union, but in the 
world, many people at that time sincerely believed that this is exactly what is going to happen. 
That was the spirit of the time in the period when the Soviet system was retaining its dynamism 
and catching up with the West. 
 
In the second half of the 20th century, however, the Soviet Union experienced the most 
dramatic shift in economic growth patterns. High post-war growth rates of the 1950s gave way 
to the slowdown of growth in the 1960s-1980s and later – to the unprecedented depression of 
the 1990s associated with the transition from CPE to a market one. Productivity growth rates 
(output per worker, Western data) fell from an exceptionally high 6% a year in the 1950s to 3% 
in the 1960s, 2% in the 1970s and 1% in the 1980s (fig. 10). In 1989 transformational recession 
started and continued for almost a decade: output was constantly falling until 1999 with the 
exception of one single year – 1997, when GDP increased by barely noticeable 0.8%. If viewed 
as an inevitable and logical result of the Soviet growth model, this transformational recession 
worsens substantially the general record of Soviet economic growth. 
 
Where have all Soviet competitiveness gone? It is important to separate the inherent 
deficiencies of CPE from the numerous problems resulting from “bad implementation” and 
caused by specific historical circumstances.  
 
It is well documented that the CPE has a lot of deficiencies associated with the practical 
impossibility to establish billions of industrial proportions (to balance supply and demand for 
millions of goods and services) from the centre, especially in a dynamic economy with 
unpredictable technical progress and innovations. Even with the use of input-output models 
and most powerful computers it was actually possible to develop a reasonable balanced plan 
for less than 1% of products (at the very best), for which the planners actually established 
production quotas in physical units.  
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Fig. 10. Annual average productivity growth rates in Soviet economy, % 
 
Source: Easterly, Fisher, 1995. 
 
 
Even if the information gathering and processing problem is resolved, if all technological 
coefficients (expenditure of i-input for the production of j-good) are precisely calculated and 
infinite size matrix can be easily inverted by super powerful computers, the dynamic problem 
still persists. Technological coefficients tend to change and new products tend to emerge not 
according to a plan, but spontaneously, due to technical progress that is not predictable by 
definition. This was exactly the argument of Ludwig von Mises (1920) in his article "Economic 
Calculation in the Socialist Commonwealth”. It was later developed by Friedrich Hayek (1944) 
in “The Road to Serfdom” – he argued that the planners will never have enough information to 
carry out reasonable allocation of resources. In his lecture “Competition as a Discovery 
Procedure” he argued that outcomes of competition are “unpredictable and on the whole 
different from those that anyone would have been able to consciously strive for” (Hayek, 1968, 
p. 10). 
 
Hence, there were losses caused by the unreliable supplies – low capacity utilization rate, high 
inventories, poor specialization of enterprises, that tended to do everything themselves not to 
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be too dependent on suppliers, and as a result – poor and falling capital productivity (Shmelev, 
Popov, 1989). But all economic systems have losses, so costs have to be weighted against 
benefits. And the benefits of CPE – the ability to mobilize domestic savings at a low level of 
development without increasing income inequality and hence the possibility to speed up 
growth, so as to ensure catch up development – seem to be spectacular as compared to costs of 
inefficiency.   
 
Leonid Kantorovich, the only Soviet economist that won the Nobel Prize (in 1975 together 
with an American Tjalling Koopmans), published in 1959 “The Best Use of Economic 
Resources“ (Kantorovich, 1959), proving mathematically that not only equilibrium, but also 
equilibrium at the optimal level is theoretically possible in a static CPE. Even more so, this 
equilibrium could be attained through setting prices for inputs and outputs (“objectively 
determined valuations” – shadow prices), not through setting production quotas in physical 
units (so called “dual problem” of production planning). At a time it looked very much like the 
planning of millions of inputs and outputs and planning of technical progress could become 
reasonably efficient within in the nearby future with greater capacity of computers and better 
techniques to manage unforeseen developments.   
 
Besides, theoretically at least, the CPE probably could have avoided the huge decline in capital 
productivity during the emergence of the command economy – in the USSR the growth rates 
fell from 20% in the 1920s to 10% in the 1930s in industry even though the investment ratio 
(the share of investment in GDP) increased from 13 to 26% (Shmelev, Popov, 1989). In China, 
however, the emergence of CPE was not associated with such a waste in resources in a form of 
declining capital productivity as in the USSR in the 1930s. And of course the argument about 
the inefficient use of savings makes sense only if these savings are available, whereas many 
developing countries were not able to mobilize savings in the first place.   
 
Theoretically, industrial policy in the USSR could have been better than the actual import 
substitution type that was never replaced by export orientation. It is inevitable that a country in 
need of industrialization starts with the import substitution policies (because the creation of 
new industries that were absent before results in crowding out foreign goods from domestic 
market), but there is a need to switch to export orientation at an appropriate point. If enterprises 
eventually do not become competitive in the international market, they evolve into grandiose, 
but useless “industrial dinosaurs” and “Egyptian pyramids” that can exist only behind a 
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protectionist wall and that go bankrupt as soon as they are exposed to the winds of 
international competition. But there are examples of export orientation within the framework of 
the CPE: China started to increase it exports at double digit rates from the early 1970s, well 
before the market type reforms.  
 
Theoretically at least, the CPE by keeping inequalities low could have avoided such costs as 
the increase in mortality and deterioration of the institutional quality. In practice, of course in 
the USSR and in China there were famines caused by economic reasons and there was some 
weakening of the institutions in the USSR during the 1970s-80s, but these features do not look 
like imminent and unavoidable.  
 
The inherent deficiency of the CPE – the lack of the mechanism to replace managers and 
bureaucrats under authoritarian regime. Neither in Eastern Europe, not in the USSR, nor in 
Cuba and Korea the top leaders were replaced before death. (It happened for the first time only 
in China with Deng’s voluntary resignation from all posts in 1990; afterwards it became a 
rule). And neither the Soviet experiments with the sovnarkhozy (territorial management bodies 
created in 1957-65 intended to replace industry branch ministries and to undermine the 
positions of the ministerial bureaucracy), nor Chinese experiments of replacing the cadres 
during Cultural Revolution could be considered successful. However, from pure economic 
point of view, this could have become the growth constraint in the future, but was not really 
constraining growth in the 1970s-80s.  
 
The quality of state institutions at the end of the planning period in China and in the USSR was 
quite high, higher than in democratic countries of the same level of development. The shadow 
economy that was reaching under Brezhnev 10-15% of GDP by most generous estimates 
increased to 50% in the 1990s. In the 1980s the corruption perception index (CPI) in the USSR 
and China was about 5 – both countries were in the middle of the list of 54 countries – cleaner 
than all developing countries and close to countries like Greece, Italy, Portugal, and South 
Korea. In 1996, after transition to the market economy and democracy, in the same list of 54 
countries Russia moved to the 48 place – between India and Venezuela. In 2011 Russia had a 
CPI of 2.4, China– 3.6, whereas Cuba – 4.2.  
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But there are some deficiencies of the CPE that were inevitable and could not have been 
avoided even theoretically. What really became the insurmountable and binding growth 
constraint in the 1970s-80s in the Soviet Union (but not in China) was the “aging” of the 
CPE resulting from aging of the fixed capital stock and the inability of the CPE to replace 
the retiring machinery and equipment, buildings and structures without aggravating 
shortages and lowering capacity utilisation rate. As argued in Popov (2007), the CPEs 
under-invested into the replacement of the retiring elements of the fixed capital stock and 
over-invested into the expansion of production capacities.  
 
As was already mentioned, shortages were inevitable in CPE almost by definition. And 
capital investment was regarded as a major tool of eliminating the bottlenecks resulting from 
shortages. So capital investment was diverted to create new production capacities that would 
have allowed expanding production of scarce goods. The whole planning procedure looked 
like an endless chain of the urgent decisions forced by emergency shortages of different 
goods that appeared faster than the planners were able to eliminate them.  
  
This was a sort of a vicious circle, a permanent race against time, in which decisions to 
make capital investment were predetermined by existing and newly emerging shortages. It 
turned out, therefore, that any attempts to cut the investment in new plant and equipment led 
to increased distortions and bottlenecks, resulting, among other things, in the lower capacity 
utilization rate, while the increased investment in the construction of new production 
facilities contributed to the wear and tear of fixed capital stock and to the widening of the 
gap between job vacancies and the limited supply of the labour force, also causing the 
decline in the capacity utilization. Under central planning, unfortunately, there was no third 
option. 
 
It was more or less possible to fight shortages in the CPE in the first 20-30 years after the 
“big push” when all available savings could have been used for eliminating constantly 
emerging bottlenecks, but after this period, when part of the savings had to be used to 
renovate the aging fixed capital stock, the remaining part was just not enough to deal with 
the bottlenecks. The choice was either not to renovate and to use all savings for shortages-
eliminating investment, or to renovate at a price of aggravating shortages. Needless to say, 
both options were bad, leading to declining capital productivity.  
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Not surprisingly, after the massive investment of the 1930s in the USSR, the highest 
productivity was achieved after the period equal to the service life of capital stock (about 20-30 
years) – before there emerged a need for the massive investment into replacing retirement. 
Afterwards, the capital stock started to age rapidly reducing sharply capital productivity and 
lowering labour productivity and TFP growth rates. 
 
Among many reasons of the decline of the growth rates in the USSR in the 1960s-1980s, the 
inability of the CPE to ensure adequate flow of investment into the replacement of retirement 
of fixed capital stock appears to be most crucial one. What is more important, even if these 
retirement constraints were not the only reason of the decline in growth rates, they are 
sufficient to explain the inevitable gradual decline after 30 years of relatively successful 
development. This way or the other, after the massive investment of the 1930s in the USSR 
(the “big push”), the highest productivity was achieved after the period equal to the service life 
of capital stock (about twenty years) before there emerged a need for massive investment into 
replacing retired stock. Afterwards, capital stock started to age rapidly, sharply reducing capital 
productivity and lowering labor productivity and the TFP growth rate. 
 
If this explanation is correct, a CPE is doomed to experience a growth slowdown after three 
decades of high growth following a “big push”. The relatively short Chinese experience with 
the CPE (1949/59-79) looks superior to the East European experience (1950-1991) and 
excessively long Soviet experience (1929-91). It was only the USSR that fully experienced all 
the negative consequences of aging of the CPE.  This is one of the reasons to believe that 
transition to the market economy in the Soviet Union would have been more successful if it 
had started in the 1960s.  
 
Was it possible – the transition to a market economy in the USSR in the 1960s?  Most 
probably, yes. It was a junction that happens in a development process from time to time, when 
the outcome – the route to take for the next several decades, if not centuries, –  is determined 
not so much by historical necessity, but by the confluence of circumstances, by the interplay of 
minor events that could produce different trajectories. If this transition to the market would 
have been carefully managed, the outcome probably could have resembled more a Chinese 
pattern of market type reforms of the 1979 and beyond – without major transformational 
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recession, without dramatic weakening of state institutions and virtual privatization of the state, 
without skyrocketing growth of shadow economy, crime, suicides and mortality.  
 
But, there were reasons why the transition to the market in the USSR in the 1960s could have 
been less successful than the Chinese. Socialism contributed to the restoration of the 
collectivist institutions in both countries, Russia and in China: income inequalities decreased 
and institutional capacity of the state improved. But the legacy of 300 years of Westernization 
in Russia kicked back once market reforms were carried out in the 1990s, after 70 years of 
socialism: inequalities increased greatly, as did corruption, crime, and shadow economy. What 
could have been repaired in China in 30 years of socialism, could not have been fixed in Russia 
even after under 70 of socialism and 60 years of central planning (since 1929), not to speak 
about 30 years. 
 
Russia could have returned to the pre-1917 trajectory of adopting the Western institutions with 
high income inequalities and polarization of the society (pretty much like it did in the 1990s). 
Transformational recessions could have been shorter and not so deep, but the weakening of the 
institutions – increase in crime and shadow economy – would be pretty much inevitable 
(Popov, 2009; 2014).  
   
In reality though, there was no transition to the market in the 1960s, so in the absence of 
rotation and control from below over managerial cadres and the inability of the CPE to 
renovate capital stock, bureaucratization of apparatus and aging of equipment and structures 
led to the growth slowdown. Sovnarkhozy reform (1957-65) designed to renovate cadres and 
officials, and khozraschet reforms (1965) designed to stimulate innovations and growth 
basically failed. Since the mid 1960s there started a decline of the CPE in the USSR. Growth of 
GDP per capita in the USSR continued in the 1970s and 1980s, but the rates of growth were 
slowing down, so that the income gap with the West stopped closing and then started to widen. 
Life expectancy after reaching 70 years in 1965 stopped growing, crimes, murders, suicides 
started to increase.  
 
To conclude, overall the record of the Soviet regime in maintaining economic growth and high 
level of welfare indicators is quite spectacular, especially until the late 1960s. Since the mid 
1960s, however, growth started to slow down, whereas social evils – mortality, crime, murders, 
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suicides, alcohol consumption – started to increase. In political and social life Khrushchev 
thaw came to an end by mid 1960s (Khrushchev was removed from power in 1964), and the 
hopes of transforming the Soviet regime into “socialism with human face” were buried in 
1968, when the Soviet troops were moved into Czechoslovakia. The primary reason for the 
slowdown of growth was the inability of the CPE to replace the retiring fixed capital stock 
without aggravating shortages. When in the 1960s, 30 years after the “big push”, time finally 
came to make such investment, the economy started to slow down.   
 
In contrast, Chinese model probably retained the possibility to transform itself into market 
socialism with limited private property of the means of production and low income 
inequalities. But inequalities started to rise in China after 1985 (after the industrial reform was 
launched in 1983), “growing out of socialism” – creation of private enterprises from scratch – 
made private property predominant in the late 1990s, effectively transforming China into the 
capitalist society.  
 
The great socialist experiment of the XX century thus came to an end with only Cuba and 
North Korea stepping into the XXI century as socialist countries. But as the old top down 
socialism of the XX century is dying out, the new grass root socialism may be growing from 
below.  
 
                        New rise of socialism – low inequalities with high savings 
Capitalism did not exist for the major part of recorded human history, until 16th century, 
because it could not be competitive. Putting individual rights ahead of the interests of the 
community was good for savings, investment and growth, but socially ruinous because of the 
increase in income inequalities that undermined social cohesion of the traditional societies and 
put masses of the population below survival line. Since 16th century capitalism became more 
competitive than any other form of social organization mainly due to its ability to mobilize 
savings through increased savings rate. But this advantage was operational only at relatively 
low levels of development, say at a level of per capita income from $500 to $25,000 in todays 
prices6. In countries with higher personal income reasonable savings rates can be generated 
without high inequalities: if there is an optimal savings rate for the society as a whole, and if 
                                               
6
 The exact borders may be different, empirical research is needed to determine these borders. The hard fact, 
however, is that after $25,000 per capita income the increase in the savings rate in the cross country comparison is 
very marginal, if any (fig.3). 
 29 
savings rate increases with per capita income, it may well be that this optimal saving rate could 
be achieved in middle income countries with very low inequality. On the other hand, at the 
high levels of income, inequality does not contribute that much (and may be not at all) to the 
national savings rate.   
 
The destruction of communal, collectivist institutions that was first carried out in Western 
countries in the sixteenth to nineteenth centuries was accompanied by an increase in income 
inequality. The available data (Milanovic, Lidert, and Williamson, 2007) suggest that in 
England, Holland, and Spain in the eighteenth century, the Gini coefficient of income 
distribution was at a level of 50 and even 60 percent (table 4)7—an extremely high level 
according to today’s standards and, most probably, according to the standards of the distant 
past (about 40 percent in Rome in the first century and in Byzantium in the eleventh century ― 
table 4).  In Denmark – a country with very good statistical records on individual incomes – the 
share of top 10% in total income in 1870-1920 was always over 40%  (reaching  54% in 1917), 
whereas Gini coefficient for this period was always higher than 40%,  exceeding 70% in 1917 
(Atkinson, Søgaard, 2013).  
 
Table. 4. Gini coefficients around particular years in Western countries, % 
Years 14 1000 1290 1550 1700 1750 1800 2000 
Rome 39        
Byzantine  41       
Holland    56  63 57 30.9 
England   36.7  55.6 52.2 59.3 37.4 
Old Castille/Spain      52.5  34.7 
Kingdom of Naples/Italy       28.1 35.9 
France       55 33 
Source: Milanovic, Lindert, Williamson, 2007; Modalsli, 2013; data for 2000 are sometimes 
from the WDI.   
 
Only in the 20th century the trend towards increase in income and wealth inequalities was 
temporarily interrupted, most probably because of the checks and balances that the socialist 
                                               
7
 In England and Wales, the Gini coefficient increased from 46 percent in 1688 to 53 percent in the 1860s (Saito, 
2009). 
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countries with very low inequalities (25-30% Ginis) provided for the capitalist system (fig. 
118).  
 
Fig. 11. Income shares of top 0.1, 1, 5 and 10% in 17 developed countries, unweighted 
average
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Note:   Unweighted average for Australia, Canada, Denmark,  Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, 
Netherlands, New Zealand Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK, United States.  
 
Source: Alvaredo, Facundo, Anthony B. Atkinson, Thomas Piketty and Emmanuel Saez, The 
World Top Incomes Database, http://g-mond.parisschoolofeconomics.eu/topincomes, April 25, 
2012. 
 
 
Data for Britain and the US based on the reconstruction of the social tables for the pre-modern 
period provide a similar picture – increase in inequalities before the 1860s and decline in the 
1930s-80s  (comparable data on 1867-1929 period are missing) – fig. 12.   
 
                                               
8
 These are the data on pre-tax income and they come not from household surveys, but from tax returns. There are 
some discrepancies between the two, but the data from household surveys for more recent periods show similar 
time trends, although inequalities in income after taxes are generally lower than before taxes.  
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Fig.  12.  Inequality in the US and UK over the long run, Gini coefficient, % 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Ginis are computed by B. Milanovic from social tables before the 20th century and 
from household survey and tax returns afterwards (Milanovic, 2013; Milanovic, Lindert, 
Williamson, 2007; and personal correspondence with B. Milanovic). 
 
 
In the United States income and wealth inequalities initially, in the late 18th century, were most 
probably lower than in Europe due to the absence of large accumulated fortunes in the New 
World and the abundance of free land. In the late 18th century top 10% of wealth holders 
accounted for only 45% of total wealth in the US as compared to 64% in Scotland and 46-80% 
in Finland, Norway, Sweden and Denmark (Soltow, 1989, p. 238). But it appears that 
inequalities increased greatly in the 19th century and in early 20th century reaching a peak in 
between two world wars. Soltow (1989, p. 251) finds some decrease in income inequality in 
1798-1850/60 in the US and slight or no increase in the wealth inequality in the same period, 
but the ratio of the largest fortunes to the median wealth of households (Phillips, 2002) tells a 
different story (fig. 13). This ratio increased from 1000 in 1790 (Elias Derby’s wealth was 
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estimated at $1 million) to 1 250 000 in 1912 (John D. Rockefellers’s fortune of $1 billion), 
fell to 60 000 in 1982 (“only” $2 billion fortune of Daniel Ludwig) and increased again to 1 
416 000 in 1999 ($85 billion fortune of Bill Gates). Turchin (2013) regards this dynamics as 
“repeated back-and-forth swings”, but recognizes that the decline in inequality after 1917 was 
associated with the rise of the workers movement in the US and “the lure of Bolshevism”.  
 
               
              Fig. 13. Largest fortunes in the US in million dollars and as a multiple of the median 
wealth of households, log scale 
Largest fortunes in million dollars (left scale) and as a multiple of median household wealth (right scale). Names of 
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Source: Phillips, 2002, p. 38.  
 
 
The comparison of wealth of richest tycoons of all the countries and epochs (fig. 15) gives 
different numbers (it is in relation to average income, not to average household wealth), but 
basically the same conclusion – Bill Gates was relatively (as compared to the average income 
in the US) poorer than Rockefeller, but richer than Carnegie and Crassus, whereas Russian 
tycoon Michail Khodorkovsky in 2003 was relatively (as compared to the average income in 
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Russia)  richer that all of them. The world may not have reached the highest point of inequality 
yet, but may be moving to the greatest inequality that was ever observed in human history.  
 
Fig. 14.   
 
Source: Milanovic, 2011.  
 
 
Data on pre-tax income from income tax returns show very high income inequalities in the US 
before the second World War, in 1913-1940  (fig. 15).  
 
 
Income inequality, of course, goes together with weak institutional capacity, as measured by 
the murder rate (fig. 16). Subjective measures of the institutional capacity – various indices, 
such as ICRG (international country risk guide), government effectiveness, rule of law, 
corruption perception indices, doing business index, etc. are negatively correlated with income 
inequalities. Islam and Montenegro (2002) claimed that income inequalities do not influence 
institutional capacity, but they were able to arrive at this result only by introducing dummy 
variables for LA and SSA – two most unequal regions of the world. In a more recent and more 
accurate study (Alonso, Garcimatrin, 2013), making all efforts to control for endogeneity, 
income inequalities have strong and significant impact on virtually all institutional indices even 
after introducing regional dummies for LA and SSA. Together with per capita GDP and 
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government tax revenues they explain 60 to 80% of variations in the quality of institutions as 
measured by the four out of six indices of the World Bank (government effectiveness, control 
over corruption, rule of law, regulatory quality, but not political stability and transparency and 
accountability), Transparency International Corruption Perception Index, Global 
Competitiveness Index (Institutions component) of the World Economic Forum, Objective 
Governance Indicators and Doing Business Indicators (Alonso, Garcimatrin, 2013).  
 
 
Fig. 15. Long term trends in income inequalities in the US, 1913-2010 
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Source: Alvaredo,  Atkinson, Piketty and Saez (2012). 
 
 
Past and recent research shows that inequalities are associated with an array of negative social 
consequences – from increase in crime and mortality to the decline in educational attainments 
and proliferation of psychological disorders and obesity (Wilkinson, Pickett, 2010). Besides, 
inequalities undermine social mobility and lead to the conservation of social stratification: the 
higher the inequalities, the higher the probability that ones’ incomes will closely resemble that 
of their parents (the Great Gatsby curve). Hence social and very often political structure of the 
society becomes less flexible as well.  
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Fig. 16. Murder rate in 2002 and income inequalities in 1990-2005 
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“…Great economic inequality has always been correlated with extreme concentration of 
political power, and that power has always been used to widen the income gaps through rent-
seeking and rent-keeping, forces that demonstrably retard economic growth” (Milanovic, 
Lindert, and Williamson, 2007). 
 
As Joseph Stiglitz explains, “widely unequal societies do not function efficiently, and their 
economies are neither stable, nor sustainable in the long run…When the wealthiest use their 
political power to benefit excessively the corporations they control, much needed revenues are 
diverted into the pockets of a few instead of benefiting society at large… That higher 
inequality is associated with lower growth – controlling for all other relevant factors – have 
been verified by looking at the range of countries and looking over longer periods of time” 
(Stiglitz, 2012, p. 83, 117). Latin American countries, writes Stiglitz, may show the future to 
other states that are just stepping on the road leading to growing inequalities. “The experience 
of Latin American countries, the region of the world with the highest level of inequality, 
foreshadows what lies ahead. Many of the countries were mired in civil conflict for decades, 
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suffered high levels of criminality and social instability. Social cohesion simply did not exist” 
(Stiglitz, 2012, p. 84).  
 
Countries at a high level of development get more costs than benefits from high income 
inequalities – they are more likely than others to end up in a vicious circle: bad equilibrium 
with poor quality of institutions, low growth, low social mobility and high social tensions.  It 
may take a revolution to break this vicious circle and to exit the bad equilibrium.  
 
All previous anti-capitalist revolutions in the XIX and early XX centuries were strongly 
associated with, if not directly caused by growing income inequalities (1830 and 1848 in 
Europe, Paris commune of 1871 in France, 1905 and 1917 in Russia, 1918 in Hungary and 
Germany). These revolutions happened not because capitalism became economically 
inefficient and could not manage appropriately productive forces whose social nature “has 
outgrown” private property. And these revolutions did not occur in most advanced countries, 
like the US and Britain. The real reason for these revolutions were social tensions caused by 
mounting income and wealth inequalities that have grown most significantly in continental 
Europe.    
 
The troubling trend since the 1980s is the new rise in income and wealth inequalities in the 
West and in many developing countries (Jomo, Popov, 2013). According to Piketty (2014), the 
period of 1914-73 was an exception in the capitalist development due to two world wars and 
Great Depression, that resulted in the destruction of capital, strong social policies during the 
New Deal in the US and in Europe after the Second World War. This is definitely part of the 
story, but not the whole story. Strong social policies and declining inequalities of the post-war 
period are due not only to the threatening events like wars and depressions, but also to the 
existence of the viable alternative to capitalism in the form of the world socialism.  
 
In a similar vein, today there is a more immediate reason for the possible continuation of the 
increase in inequalities – elimination of checks and balances that world socialism and workers 
movement posed to world capitalism before. Some time in the 1970s it became clear that the 
world socialism is not catching up with the West, and that it is no longer an appealing 
alternative to capitalism. The wave of neo-conservatism, Thatcher in Britain and Reagan in the 
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US, with harsh policies towards the workers movement was the capitalist response to the new 
social configuration. Government spending, including social spending, stopped growing, many 
welfare programs were curtailed, unemployment rose to 50 years highs, trade unions had to 
retreat in many important strikes (coal miners in the UK, air traffic controllers in the US), their 
membership declined. Top income tax rates that were always higher than 50% in the US, UK, 
Germany, France in 1940-80 (and sometimes as high as 90%+), dropped to below 50% by 
2010 (fig. 17).  No surprise, income inequalities started to rise in most countries (fig. 11-14).  
 
 
Fig. 17. Top income tax rates in the US, UK, Germany and France in 1900-2010, %  
 
Source:  Technical appendix of the book «Capital in the 21st century» by  Thomas Piketty  
Harvard University Press - March 2014 (http://piketty.pse.ens.fr/capital21c) 
 
 
The fall of the Berlin Wall, collapse of the USSR and the conversion of Eastern Europe and 
former Soviet republics to capitalism, added additional push to the growing income inequalities 
trend. Chinese transition to “socialism with Chinese characteristics” proved to be a transition to 
capitalism – private enterprises were rapidly emerging from scratch, creeping privatisation was 
going on since 1995, so by the turn of the XX century 75% of output was already produced at 
non-state enterprises. Income inequalities increased greatly in China and Chinese model started 
to loose its appeal as a more just alternative to the capitalist society.   
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It may be hypothesised that the continuation of these trends could result in two outcomes. First, 
there may be social upheavals in some countries, where social tensions due to growing 
inequalities will become unbearable and produce a socialist revolution, so the world goes once 
again over the familiar historical track. Even small socialist countries, like Cuba, if they are 
successful, may create a counterbalance through the demonstration effect to the tendency of 
unconstrained capitalism to cut welfare programs and increase inequalities.  
 
Second, countries that carry out successful policies of limiting inequalities would become more 
competitive, driving other countries “out of business”. By limiting inequalities these societies 
will be drifting in the direction of socialism. They will likely remain market economies 
because by introducing central planning they will be running into the problem of creating 
imbalances and shortages and inadequate investment into the renovation of retiring capital 
stock – pretty much like “old” socialist countries in the XX century. But they will likely limit 
substantially the functioning of the market mechanisms through direct regulations and high 
progressive taxation to reduce bubbles and windfall profits. Besides, the crucial way of 
lowering inequalities is public and collective property, so it could be expected that state 
enterprises, non-profit institutions, labour managed enterprises and coops, operating not for 
profits, but for public good would become more common. 
 
This would be the new grass root socialism growing from below and becoming more 
competitive than capitalist societies. The latter would have all the shortcomings of high 
inequality environment, from poor institutional capacity to greater social tensions, and no more 
advantages in the form of high savings rate that enables faster growth. If this hypothesis is 
correct, in the world of relatively high per capita income (over $25,000, for the sake of the 
argument) socialist low inequalities countries and communities will have the same saving rate 
as capitalist societies with high inequalities. This is only a hypothesis though based on the 
projection of current trends into the future.  
 
                                                         In lieu of conclusions 
The impact of the crisis and eventual breakdown of world socialism on the fate of capitalism as 
a system was ambiguous and even treacherous. In a sense, the collapse of socialism played a 
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bad joke on capitalism. Socialism was “alter ego” of capitalism, it created checks and balances, 
forcing to limit capitalist greed for profits and to introduce social programs. Unconstrained 
capitalism, without the moderating impact of socialism, is likely to repeat the mistakes that it 
committed a century ago and that finally led to the emergence of socialism. It is likely to drive 
inequalities up to the extent of bringing capitalism to the point of inefficiency and perhaps even 
self destruction.  
 
In short, capitalism is digging its own grave, to paraphrase the famous statement of Communist 
Manifesto, albeit not on the reasons, outlined by Marx and Engels. It is loosing its advantages 
(high savings rate today may be achieved without inequalities) and acquiring new deficiencies 
– worsening of the institutional capacity and mounting social tensions due to the rise in income 
inequalities. To put it differently, capitalism can exist without committing a suicide only with 
its socialist “alter ego” that prevents it from creating destructive inequalities and social 
tensions. Without socialism in sight, capitalist train inevitably develops a dangerous speed and 
can be saved from crash only by a turnover into the direction of socialism.  
  
On the other hand, democratic socialism with limited central planning looks increasingly 
appealing and competitive. It can mobilize savings for growth without income inequalities, and 
it can avoid all nuisances of social polarization.  
 
Socialism of the XX century emerged democratically at least in Russia, China, Korea and 
Cuba, supported by the majority of the population, but it did not manage to stay democratic. 
The new XXI century socialism that will emerge democratically and stay democratic can avoid 
mistakes of the old socialism. This “new socialism” will not necessarily mean a total 
elimination of markets and private property, but is likely to limit both substantially for the sake 
of achieving lower income inequality. 
 
They say that all great ideas initially come to this world in a perverse form and socialism is no 
exception. This paper spells out reasons why the second attempt could be more successful. Old 
socialism of the XX century is dead. Long live new socialism of the XXI century! 
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